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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1959 Herder Spring Hunting Club (“Herder Spring”) purchased
a 460-acre tract of land in Centre County, Pennsylvania.1 Prior to the
purchase, Herder Spring performed a title search and found that ap-
proximately sixty years earlier, predecessors-in-title Harry and Anna
Keller had severed the land’s subsurface mineral rights from the sur-
face estate by reserving the minerals in their conveyance of the sur-
† Marc Prokopchak is a member of the Class of 2016 at Widener University,
Commonwealth Law School. Prokopchak graduated summa cum laude from Messiah
College where he received his B.S. in Political Science.
1. Herder Spring Hunting Club v. Keller, 93 A.3d 465, 467 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2014),
petition for allowance of appeal granted, 108 A.3d 1279 (Pa. 2015).
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face,2 and had properly recorded the conveyance and reservation.3
Upon discovering the mineral rights reservation, Herder Spring’s at-
torney suggested to the seller that a clause should be included in the
deed to cover this reservation, and such a clause was added prior to
the conveyance to Herder Spring.4
In 1973, despite full knowledge of the mineral reservation in the
chain of title, Herder Spring began a twenty-five year span of leases
on the mineral rights.5 Then in 2008, Herder Spring commenced a
quiet title action against the Kellers and their heirs in the Court of
Common Pleas, claiming superior title to the subsurface minerals.6
When the lower court sided with the Kellers, Herder Spring appealed
to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, and subsequently was awarded
title to the subsurface mineral rights in May 2014.7
If this outcome seems peculiar in light of commonly understood
principles of property law, that is because it is. Absent careful inspec-
tion of 19th and early 20th century Pennsylvania statutes and case law,
or first-hand experience with title disputes relating to valuable subsur-
face mineral rights in the Pennsylvania Marcellus Shale region, the
idea that the Keller heirs could be stripped of their property interest
seems anathema to fundamental property concepts. For those familiar
with the intricacies of the law, however, Herder Spring provided a
fresh endorsement of the “arcane”8 Pennsylvania property law con-
cept known as the title wash.
To understand the title wash concept, one must first understand the
underlying laws that brought it into existence. Accordingly, this Arti-
cle will begin by providing a brief overview of Pennsylvania’s histori-
cal treatment of land for taxation purposes, as well as several
important early 1800s state legislative acts, before discussing how
2. For purposes of this article, unless otherwise specified, the terms “minerals,”
“mineral rights,” and “mineral estate” will include all coal, clay, oil, natural gas, and
other minerals.  It is well settled in Pennsylvania under the Dunham Rule that the
term “minerals” alone in a private conveyance does not include oil and natural gas.
See Dunham v. Kirkpatrick, 101 Pa. 36 (1882); see also Butler v. Charles Powers Es-
tate ex rel. Warren, 65 A.3d 885, 897–98 (Pa. 2013) (affirming the validity of the long-
standing Dunham Rule). The vast majority of the cases addressed in this article—
cases that comprise the bulk of Pennsylvania title wash jurisprudence—do not impli-
cate the Dunham Rule, as the mineral reservations and conveyances at issue explicitly
enumerate oil and natural gas. See, e.g., Hutchinson v. Kline, 49 A. 312, 317 (Pa.
1901) (“[r]eserving and excepting . . . the gas, coal, iron, and petroleum therein”)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
3. Herder Spring, 93 A.3d at 467.
4. Id. The clause states, “This conveyance is subject to all exceptions and reserva-
tions as are contained in the chain of title.” Id.
5. Brief of Appellees at 2–3, Herder Spring Hunting Club v. Keller, 93 A.3d 465
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2014) (No. 718 MDA 2013), 2013 WL 8560042, at *2–3.
6. Herder Spring, 93 A.3d at 466.
7. Id. at 465, 473.
8. The Superior Court itself used this word to describe the law upon which it
relied. See id. at 468.
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these two subjects work together to “wash” a title. This discussion will
also include the subsequent changes to the laws that effectively abro-
gated the title wash for more recent titles with less extensive chains of
ownership.
Next, this Article will examine the Pennsylvania and related federal
courts’ treatment of the title wash and its underlying principles over
the past 125 years. As will be shown, until the 2014 Herder Spring
decision, for more than 100 years the courts largely had been trending
away from title wash principles and moving towards a more modern
property and real estate tax law perspective. Finally, a balanced solu-
tion to the problem will be proposed that advocates for a rule to allow
title holders of previously severed and properly recorded subsurface
mineral rights at least an opportunity to defend and retain their prop-
erty rights in the face of a title wash claim. The proposed rule will
begin with a rebuttable presumption in favor of the validity of the
washed title containing both the surface and subsurface estates. This
presumption then can be rebutted by affirmative evidence showing:
(1) a separate assessment of the subsurface mineral estate, taxes paid
on the subsurface mineral estate, or proof that the assessment used for
the tax sale specified separate estates; or (2) a valid, properly recorded
severance of the surface and subsurface estates prior to the date of the
assessment utilized at the tax sale. This proposed rule would operate
prospectively rather than retroactively. Thus, if adopted, it would ap-
ply only to pending and future title controversies, so as not to require
re-litigation of previously settled title disputes.
II. THE RELEVANCE OF THE TITLE WASH
Before delving into the title wash concept, it makes sense to briefly
explain the significance of the property rights potentially affected by
this issue—i.e., why the title wash matters today. First, because many
of the title disputes impacted by the title wash controversy concern
land situated above the Marcellus Shale, the enormous economic
value of the properties in dispute demands heightened scrutiny of this
issue. Second, the title wash raises significant underlying fairness con-
cerns, especially when it divests unknowing record property owners of
their constitutionally revered property interests.
For those unfamiliar with the Marcellus Shale, this geological phe-
nomenon is an enormous underground sedimentary rock formation
that involves large portions of Pennsylvania, eastern Ohio, West Vir-
ginia, and southern New York.9 Trapped within this rock formation
are large natural gas reserves, which experts estimate contain any-
where from 168 to 516 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, valued con-
9. Nicole R. Snyder Bagnell & Stephanie L. Hadgkiss, Eastern Shale Plays—A
Game Plan for Success, 55 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 32-1, § 32.03 (2009).
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWR\2-3\TWR307.txt unknown Seq: 4  4-DEC-15 10:47
536 TEXAS A&M J. OF PROP. L. [Vol. 2
servatively in the hundreds of billions of dollars.10 Due to recent
developments in drilling technology that have made this gas accessi-
ble, by leasing their property interests to oil and gas companies, own-
ers of mineral rights stand to profit considerably from lease fees and
royalty payments.11
Pennsylvania, where the shale formations are thickest, has received
the most attention from the oil and gas industry,12 creating what has
been coined a new “gold rush” in gas drilling in the Pennsylvania
Marcellus Shale regions.13 Put simply, the determination of oil and
natural gas ownership in Pennsylvania—a task often complicated by
the title wash—has significant financial implications for the parties
involved.
More important, however, are the fairness concerns raised by a sys-
tem that has for many years enabled record owners to be divested of
their duly recorded property interests for simply failing to follow a tax
reporting statute (or for not having sufficient proof that the statute
was followed, but no tax liability was incurred). As discussed further
in Section IV(A) below, this is usually a much more severe punish-
ment than the crime warrants. The inequities of the title wash system
are further magnified in situations like Herder Spring, where the land
purchaser buys with full knowledge of the recorded mineral estate res-
ervation but strategically uses the title wash to claim superior title to
the property.14
III. THE ORIGINS OF THE PENNSYLVANIA TITLE WASH
In order to understand the concept of the title wash, one must first
understand how Pennsylvania historically treated developed and un-
developed land differently for taxation purposes. This disparate treat-
ment and its concomitant effect on tax sales of the land, coupled with
several critical early 1800s statutes, created the title wash system.
10. Id.
11. See Michael Morris, Buyer’s Remorse over Your Pennsylvania Gas Lease? The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court Upholds Meager Royalty Payments and Protects the
Profitability of Marcellus Gas Drilling in Kilmer v. Elexco Land Services, Inc., 23
VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 25, 25–26 (2012); Matt Warnock, Marcellus and Utica Shale Natural
Gas Development Presents New Revenue Opportunities, New Challenges for Local
Governments in Ohio, 23 No. 1 OHIO MUN. SERVICE 2, 2 (2011) (noting in 2010, lease
prices in Ohio reached $6,000 per acre, with an additional fifteen to twenty percent
royalty payment for natural gas produced).
12. Bagnell & Hadgkiss, supra note 9, § 32.03.
13. See Kristen Allen, The Big Fracking Deal: Marcellus Shale—Pennsylvania’s
Untapped Re$ource, 23 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 51, 52 (2012); George A. Bibkos & Jeffrey
C. King, A Primer on Oil and Gas Law in the Marcellus Shale States, 4 TEX. J. OIL
GAS & ENERGY L. 155, 156 (2008–2009) (“a gold rush mentality has been developing
in the Marcellus Shale states”); see also Bagnell & Hadgkiss, supra note 9, at § 32.04
(noting there were only thirty to forty gas wells in the Marcellus Shale region of Penn-
sylvania in January 2008, but 8,000 new drilling permits were issued that year alone).
14. For a synopsis of the case’s factual background, see supra text accompanying
notes 1, 3–7. R
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A. Seated and Unseated Land
Historically, Pennsylvania considered land to be either “seated” or
“unseated” for real estate tax assessments.15 Unseated land was that
which, in the eye of the assessor, was unimproved or uncultivated—
judged solely by “what has been or is being done upon it.”16 Seated
land, on the other hand, was land that the assessor found to have
“such permanent improvements as indicate a personal responsibility
for the taxes.”17 The seated or unseated distinction applied to the en-
tire real property, as well as to separate estates if, for example, the
surface had been severed from the subsurface.18
The foregoing description of seated land from Hutchinson v. Kline
highlights the importance of the historical differentiation between the
two types of property.19 If the assessor considered the land seated, the
property taxes were assessed against the owner; if the land was ad-
judged unseated, the taxes were assessed against the land itself.20 This
distinction had important consequences. As the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania explained in Fager v. Campbell,21 in regards to unseated
land, “[t]he land itself, not the owner of it, is debtor for the public
charge; and it is therefore immaterial, at the moment of sale, what
may be the state of the ownership . . . .”22 Thus, if real estate taxes
were not paid on seated lands, the owner was charged with the debt,
whereas if the taxes for unseated lands went unpaid, the land itself
was considered the debtor and would pay its public debt in the only
way possible—tax sale by the county treasurer.
B. Important Early 1800s Pennsylvania Statutes
The second major component in the creation of the title wash was
several state legislative initiatives of the early 1800s, in particular, the
Act of 3 April, 1804 and the Act of 28 March, 1806. After the Revolu-
15. See Herder Spring Hunting Club v. Keller, 93 A.3d 465, 469 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2014).
16. Stoetzel v. Jackson, 105 Pa. 562, 567 (1884); see also Rosenburger v. Schull, 7
Watts 390, 393 (Pa. 1838) (describing how an assessor would evaluate cultivated land
to determine whether to return it as seated or unseated).
17. Hutchinson v. Kline, 49 A. 312, 313 (Pa. 1901).
18. See F. H. Rockwell & Co. v. Warren Cnty., 77 A. 665, 665–66 (Pa. 1910) (ex-
plaining that unseated land could be severed into separate surface and mineral es-
tates, with each estate subject to separate valuation and assessment in the manner
unseated real property was treated at that time).
19. See Hutchinson, 49 A. at 313.
20. Stoetzel, 105 Pa. at 567.
21. See Fager v. Campbell, 5 Watts 287 (Pa. 1836).
22. Id. at 288; see also Act of April 3, 1804 § 5, 4 SM. L. 201 (repealed 1949)
(“[S]ales of unseated lands, for taxes that are now due . . . shall be in law and equity
valid and effectual . . . to vest in the purchaser or purchasers of lands sold as aforesaid,
all the estate and interest therein, that the real owner or owners thereof had at the
time of such sale, although the land may not have been taxed or sold in the name of
the real owner thereof.”).
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tionary War, due in part to its large war debt, Pennsylvania attempted
to fill its coffers through the sale of warrants for approximately 5 mil-
lion acres of mostly undeveloped state-owned land.23 Inflation, along
with abuse of the Commonwealth’s easily gamed land grant system,
created fertile grounds for land speculation, with some notorious spec-
ulators individually accumulating over 1 million acres of Common-
wealth land.24
When the land speculation bubble burst and speculators were una-
ble to pay for land purchased on credit, the legislature enacted several
laws to ease the taxing and selling of unseated land.25 The Act of 3
April, 1804 (“1804 Act”) vested tax sale purchasers of unseated lands
with good title to “all the estate and interest therein[ ] that the real
owner or owners thereof had at the time of such sale, although the
land may not have been taxed or sold in the name of the real owner
thereof.”26 Unseated land, therefore, could be sold at a tax sale, iden-
tified only by a description of the land—usually in the name of the
original warrants—since the law was not concerned with the actual
owner.27 The 1804 Act also required county commissioners to create
records of known unseated lands, and provided a five-year statute of
repose to challenge a tax sale of land or interests.28
Equally important for the title wash, especially when the surface
and subsurface estates had been severed, was the Act of 28 March,
1806 (“1806 Act”). It stated, in pertinent part:
[I]t shall be the duty of every person hereafter becoming a holder of
unseated lands by gift, grant or other conveyance to furnish a [state-
ment to the county commissioners signed by holder of unseated
lands containing a description of each and every tract so held, the
name of the person or persons to whom the original tract so held,
the name of the person or persons to whom the original title from
the commonwealth passed, and the nature, number and date of such
original title], together with the date of the conveyance to such
holder, and the name of the grantor, within one year, from and after
such conveyance; and on failure of any holder of unseated lands to
comply with the injunctions of this act, it shall be the duty of the
county commissioners to assess on every tract of land, respecting
which such default shall be made when discovered, four times the
23. See Lester L. Greevy Jr. & John A. Shoemaker, Shale Gas Ownership—Tax-
Sale Titles: An Historical Perspective of the Pennsylvania Title Wash, 85 PA. B. ASS’N
Q. 106, 107 (2014).
24. Id. at 108.
25. Id. at 108–09.
26. Id. at 109.
27. See infra text accompanying notes 31–33. See also F.H. Rockwell & Co. v. R
Warren Cnty., 77 A. 665, 665–66 (Pa. 1910) (“unseated lands are assessed by survey or
warrant numbers, regardless of the owners whose names if used at all are only for the
purposes of description”).
28. Greevy & Shoemaker, supra note 23, at 109. An 1815 statute decreased the
period of redemption for land or interests sold at a tax sale to two years. Id.
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amount of the tax to which such tract or tracts of land would have
been otherwise liable, and to enforce the collection thereof, in the
same manner that taxes due on unseated lands are or may be as-
sessed and collected . . . .29
The 1806 Act thus provided an affirmative duty for owners of newly
acquired unseated property to report the interest to the proper taxing
authorities or face a four-fold tax penalty. This duty applied equally to
those who obtained title to only the surface or subsurface estate as to
those who acquired entire unseated property, because each estate—
whether entire, subsurface, or surface—was considered a separate
property interest for taxation purposes.30
The key to the title wash came with the disparate treatment of un-
seated land at tax sales. If an owner of seated land failed to pay the
requisite real estate taxes, he could not then legally purchase a better
title to the land at a resulting tax sale, because “one cannot profit
from his own wrong, or build up or acquire a title founded upon his
own neglect.”31 Because taxes on seated land were assessed against
the owner, a purchase of the land at a subsequent tax sale by the
owner would be merely a “payment” or redemption for the taxes
owed.32 But because the tax obligation for unseated land was assessed
against the land itself rather than the owner, a purchase of the un-
seated land at a tax sale, even by the record owner, was not consid-
ered a redemption.33
A helpful example of this principle is found in Powell v. Lantzy.34
There, Flinn, the owner of an entire tract of unseated land, sold the
surface estate but reserved the subsurface mineral rights.35 The new
owner of the surface estate subsequently conveyed the property to
Lantzy; Flinn likewise conveyed the reserved subsurface mineral es-
tate to new owners.36 Prior to the severance and conveyances, how-
ever, Flinn had failed to pay the real estate taxes that were assessed
29. Act of 28 March, 1806 § 1, 4 SM. L. 346.  In 1933 this law was repealed and
replaced by 72 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5020-409, remaining nearly identical to the original
version. See 72 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5020-409.  It was partially repealed in 2010 insofar
as it concerned counties of the second class A, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, and
eighth classes of the state. See 53 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8801.
30. See Powell v. Lantzy, 34 A. 450, 451–52 (Pa. 1896) (citing Neill v. Lacy, 1 A.
325 (Pa. 1885) (“[T]he owner of mineral rights by virtue of a reservation in a deed is
[not a joint owner with] the owner of the surface.  Each has a separate estate.  After
the severance of the surface from the minerals by conveyance, they form separate
estates.”)); see also supra note 18. R
31. Powell, 34 A. at 451.
32. Id.
33. Id.; see also Ronald J. Hicks, Jr. & David G. Oberdick, Debunking the Myths
Surrounding Natural Gas Title Washing: “How Can One’s Title Be Divested If Natural
Gas Was Not and Cannot Be the Subject of a Proper Real Estate Tax Assessment?” 85
PA. B. ASS’N Q. 14, 16 (2014).
34. Powell, 34 A. at 451.
35. Id.
36. Id.
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on the entire estate.37 When title to the unseated land, assessed and
taxed as an entire estate prior to severance, was sold at a tax sale,
Lantzy—already the owner of the surface rights—bought the tax sale
title to the entire property.38 The owners of the mineral estate sued,
claiming, among other things, that Lantzy, as the surface estate owner,
could not have acquired good title to the entire estate at the tax sale
since at the time of the sale he owned part of the property assessed
and sold.39 The court rejected the mineral estate owners’ claims, hold-
ing that nothing prevented an owner of unseated lands from purchas-
ing a better title at a tax sale, as there existed “no personal
responsibility on the owner therefor . . . [since] [t]he land alone was
liable.”40
Thus, title washing became “a means by which an owner of un-
seated land could cure any defects in his former title by defaulting on
the assessed real estate taxes and then purchasing the unseated land at
the subsequent tax sale.”41 Furthermore, due to the 1806 Act report-
ing requirements for unseated land, and the unseated land tax sale
procedures (both outlined above), the theory developed that when the
subsurface mineral estate was severed but unreported and not sepa-
rately assessed, a subsequent tax sale of the surface estate could rejoin
the two estates and give good title for the entire property to the tax
sale buyer.42 If the newly created mineral estate was not reported ac-
cording to the 1806 Act requirements, and the assessment utilized for
the tax sale of the unseated land treated the land as a whole, the
whole is what was conveyed by tax deed.43
It takes little imagination to see the potential for fraud with such a
concept, and indeed, fraud inevitably ensued. The large-scale version
of fraud followed this general scheme: owners of extensive tracts of
unseated land who wanted to corner the leather and timber markets
would convey the surface estates to a company they owned, but would
reserve the subsurface mineral rights; the owners would intentionally
forego reporting the severance and paying the property taxes on the
newly created mineral estates; the company would then allow the sur-
face estate property taxes to lapse, permit the surface estate to go to a
tax sale, and use a strawman to purchase the property at the tax sale—
but now with the surface and subsurface estates theoretically rejoined;
finally, the strawman would hold the property for the statutory re-




40. Powell, 34 A. at 451 (citing Coxe v. Gibson, 27 Pa. 160 (1856)).
41. Hicks & Oberdick, supra 33, at 17.
42. See generally Hutchinson v. Kline, 49 A. 312 (Pa. 1901).
43. Id. at 313.
44. Greevy & Shoemaker, supra note 23, at 112–13.
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Thus, the original landowners avoided real estate taxes on the sub-
surface mineral rights, cornered the leather and timber markets, and
recovered the property as a whole without paying back taxes. Moreo-
ver, the owner of the surface estate conceivably could follow such a
scheme regardless of who conveyed the surface estate and reserved
the mineral rights—whether a co-conspirator or an unaffiliated and
unknowing landowner—so long as the subsurface mineral estate
owner failed to follow the 1806 Act reporting requirements or redeem
the mineral estate within the statutory period following the tax sale.
Beyond the potential for outright fraud, the tax sale title wash and
concomitant theoretical reunification of the previously severed estates
creates the potential for a buyer with good notice of the severance of
the mineral estate to purchase the surface estate and claim title to the
whole.
As long as there was a tax sale after the severance in the unseated
surface estate’s chain of title, and there exists no proof that the min-
eral estate was separately assessed or taxed after the severance as re-
quired by the 1806 Act, the buyer can claim the tax sale reunified the
surface and subsurface estates. This is, in fact, exactly what happened
in Herder Spring.45
Moreover, due largely to one instrumental Pennsylvania Supreme
Court ruling from over 100 years ago, the buyer may succeed in di-
vesting the record mineral rights owner of the subsurface estate.
Hutchinson v. Kline involved an action for ejectment brought by the
mineral rights owners of a tract of unseated land against Kline,46 the
successor-in-title to the tax-sale purchaser of the surface estate.47
Kline claimed the tax sale title was good as to both the surface and
subsurface estates.48 While much of the opinion is dedicated to the
parties’ disagreement over whether the land was seated or unseated,
the court, relying on the assessment used for the tax sale and the
dearth of evidence of the mineral estate owners’ compliance with the
1806 Act, decided the tax sale had effectively divested the record min-
eral estate owners of their property interest.49 The court stated:
It was not shown . . . the [record mineral estate owners] . . . paid
taxes to Elk county upon the mineral rights reserved, nor returned
them for the purpose of taxation in one body. This the [record min-
eral estate owners] were required to do by the act of the 28th of
March, 1806. If they desired their separate estate to be assessed and
taxed separate and apart from the surface, there should have been a
severance of this separate estate in the assessment.50
45. See supra text accompanying notes 1, 3–7. R
46. Hutchinson v. Kline, 49 A. 312 (Pa. 1901).
47. Id. at 312–13.
48. Id.
49. See id. at 313, 317–19.
50. Id. at 313.
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The court further explained that simply because the newly created
mineral estate was recorded does not imply the proper taxing authori-
ties had notice of the severance: “[t]he record of the deed creating a
separate estate in the minerals would not be notice to the assessor or
the commissioners, as they were not bound to search or examine the
records.”51 For supporters of the title wash, insofar as it relates to sev-
ered surface and mineral estates, Hutchinson v. Kline is viewed as the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s “stamp of approval” on the the-
ory,52 and has been relied upon heavily in subsequent mineral estate
title disputes.53
C. The End of the Title Wash for Modern Real Estate Titles
In 1947, Pennsylvania revised many of its real estate tax laws.54
Both seated and unseated land was to be considered “property” for
the revised real estate tax statute.55 As such, the same tax sale proce-
dures and notice requirements provided by the 1947 tax revision
would apply equally to owners of seated and unseated land.56 The no-
tice procedures for Pennsylvania real estate tax sales, established by
the 1947 law, underwent further changes that tracked the pivotal
United States Supreme Court decisions57 on constitutional notice re-
quirements.58 Thus, before their property interest can be sold at a tax
sale, record owners of unseated mineral estates created after the 1947
tax law revisions are now entitled to the same notice procedures as
seated landowners.59
Pennsylvania has also altered the way it treats oil and natural gas
for ad valorem taxation. Early Pennsylvania case law held that oil and
natural gas (along with other minerals comprising the subsurface es-
51. Id. at 318.
52. See Greevy & Shoemaker, supra note 23, at 113.
53. See, e.g., Day v. Johnson, 31 Pa. D. & C.3d 556, 559 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1983); Brief
of Appellant at 15, 18, Herder Spring Hunting Club v. Keller, 93 A.3d 465 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2014) (No. 718 MDA 2013), 2013 WL 8560039, at *15, *18; Brief of Amicus Cu-
riae, Southwestern Energy Production Co. at 13–14, Herder Spring Hunting Club v.
Keller, (Pa. Super. Ct. 2014) (No. 718 MDA 2013), 2013 WL 8560040, at *13–14;
Pennsylvania v. Thomas E. Proctor Heirs Trust, No. 1:12-CV-1567, 2014 WL 3696288
at *7 (M.D. Pa. July 24, 2014).
54. Greevy & Shoemaker, supra note 23, at 113; see also 72 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 5860.101.
55. See 72 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5860.102 (describing “property” as including “both
seated and unseated land”).
56. See 72 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 5860.301–.609.
57. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950); see also
Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791 (1983).
58. Hicks & Oberdick, supra note 33, at 15.
59. First Pa. Bank, N.A. v. Lancaster Cnty. Tax Claim Bureau, 470 A.2d 938, 942
(Pa. 1983) (those with a legally protected property interest are “entitled to notice
reasonably calculated to apprise [them] of a pending tax sale”) (quoting Mennonite
Bd. of Missions, 462 U.S. at 798).
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWR\2-3\TWR307.txt unknown Seq: 11  4-DEC-15 10:47
2015] RENEWING RESPECT FOR RECORD NOTICE 543
tate) could be treated as land for real estate taxation purposes.60 In
2002, however, the state’s highest court decided Independent Oil &
Gas Ass’n of Pennsylvania v. Board of Assessment Appeals,61 holding
that underground oil and natural gas do not fall within the meaning of
“real estate” or “lands” in current assessment laws, and therefore, be-
cause no statutory authority exists to assess oil and natural gas inter-
ests, those interests cannot be subject to ad valorem taxes.62 It follows
then, that if oil and natural gas interests are not subject to ad valorem
taxes, those interests cannot be sold for unpaid taxes at a sheriff’s sale,
as no overdue ad valorem taxes on those interests could exist in the
first place. The 2002 Independent Oil & Gas Association (“IOGA”)
decision, however, has been limited to prospective application only.63
These changes to Pennsylvania statutes and jurisprudence have ef-
fectively eliminated the possibility of modern-day title washing by
modifying how unseated subsurface estates can be assessed and sold
at tax sales and by clarifying what can be assessed for ad valorem taxa-
tion purposes in the first place. Furthermore, prior to the 2014 Herder
Spring decision, Pennsylvania courts had been steadily moving away
from the anachronistic property concepts that enabled the title wash.
IV. POST-HUTCHINSON V. KLINE JURISPRUDENCE:
A MORE MODERN APPROACH
As previously noted, Hutchinson v. Kline is regarded by many to be
a ringing endorsement of the idea that, under the right circum-
stances,64 a tax sale of unseated land could effectively rejoin previ-
ously severed surface and subsurface estates and give good title of
both to the tax sale purchaser.65 But beginning almost immediately
after this 1901 decision, Pennsylvania courts largely began to move
away from many concepts inherent in the tax sale title wash of previ-
ously severed surface and mineral estates.
60. See F. H. Rockwell & Co. v. Warren Cnty., 77 A. 665, 666 (Pa. 1910) (sever-
ance of mineral rights from unseated surface estate creates an “estate in land subject
to taxation”); see also Powell v. Lantzy, 34 A. 450, 451–52 (Pa. 1896) (accord).
61. See Indep. Oil & Gas Ass’n of Pa. v. Bd. of Assessment Appeals of Fayette
Cnty., 814 A.2d 180 (Pa. 2002).
62. Id. at 184. See also Coolspring Stone Supply, Inc. v. Cnty. of Fayette, 929 A.2d
1150, 1157 n.9 (Pa. 2007) (explaining that because statutory authority is a prerequisite
for a valid tax, absence of oil and natural gas from assessment laws precludes ad
valorem taxes on those interests); Hicks & Oberdick, supra note 33, at 16.
63. Greevy & Shoemaker, supra note 23, at 115; see also Oz Gas, Ltd. v. Warren
Area Sch. Dist., 938 A.2d 274, 283 (Pa. 2007) (holding IOGA decision applies
prospectively).
64. 49 A. 312 (Pa. 1901).
65. See supra text accompanying notes 45–53. R
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A. F. H. Rockwell & Co. v. Warren County
Only a few years after its Hutchinson v. Kline decision, the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania took up F. H. Rockwell & Co. v. Warren
County.66 While not overruling Hutchinson v. Kline, the F. H.
Rockwell court spent a large portion of its opinion emphasizing that a
severed mineral estate must be assessed properly in order for good
title to the estate to be passed at a subsequent tax sale, and also pro-
vided examples of how such oil and gas interests may properly be
assessed.
In F. H. Rockwell’s underlying title dispute, the plaintiffs owned
nearly 10,000 acres of unseated land and conveyed the surface prop-
erty while reserving the mineral rights for themselves.67 For the years
1904, 1905, 1906, and 1907, the county assessed, and the surface own-
ers paid, the ad valorem taxes on the surface estate, but the plaintiffs
failed to pay the separate ad valorem taxes assessed by the county on
the reserved mineral estate.68 When the mineral estate was placed on
the county treasurer’s sale list due to unpaid taxes, the plaintiffs filed
suit to enjoin the tax sale, claiming that, although separate surface and
subsurface estates existed, there was no legal authority to separately
assess the mineral estate.69
After a lower court ruling granted the plaintiffs’ requested injunc-
tion, the county appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court.70 The
Superior Court reversed the decision, holding that when the surface
and subsurface estates of unseated land are severed, each should be
separately assessed and taxed according to its value.71 On appeal, the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the Superior Court’s deci-
sion, concluding that: (1) unseated land could be severed into separate
surface and mineral estates; (2) each estate was properly considered
an interest in land for real estate taxation purposes; and (3) the power
to tax each estate separately “necessarily attache[d].”72
Interestingly, the court found it important to conclude its opinion
with the following caveat:
[I]t is important to keep in mind the fact that the right to tax de-
pends upon the valuation and assessment of a definite estate in
land. If there is no land, there is nothing to tax, and this principle
applies as well to minerals as to surface. Because there may be a
reservation of oil and gas by the grantor of the surface, or there may
be an express grant of all the oil and gas underlying one or several
tracts of land, it does not follow that in point of fact there is any
66. 77 A. 665 (Pa. 1910).
67. Rockwell v. Keefer, 39 Pa. Super. 468, 469 (1909).
68. Id. at 469–70.
69. Id. at 470.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 476–77.
72. F. H. Rockwell & Co. v. Warren Cnty., 77 A. 665, 666 (Pa. 1910).
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such estate in existence. When the assessor goes upon the land, it is
his duty to make a valuation upon information or knowledge which
will furnish some definite fixed basis of valuation. A mere naked
reservation of oil and gas in a deed without any other facts to base a
valuation upon is not sufficient to warrant the assessment of taxes.
Development in the neighborhood, sales of oil or gas lands in close
enough proximity to add value, or any other element of value which
may form a basis of valuation may be taken into consideration by
the assessor or other taxing authorities, but it should always be
borne in mind that real estate is the thing being dealt with, and that
oil and gas are considered real estate, and, if there be no oil and gas,
then there is not real estate to be taxed.73
It is telling that in 1910, only nine years after Hutchinson v. Kline, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court felt it necessary to highlight that a pre-
requisite to the local government’s ability to assess and collect real
estate taxes on an estate—whether entire, surface, or mineral—was
some evidence that the estate actually existed and had value.
While mineral rights, including oil and natural gas, were subject to
ad valorem taxes at this time,74 according to the court, a mere reserva-
tion of these rights was not enough to trigger the levying of real estate
taxes.75 Instead, there had to be some facts tending to prove that min-
erals actually existed to properly value the mineral estate for the as-
sessment and collection of ad valorem taxes, and to put that mineral
estate up for sale if such taxes went unpaid.76 Thus, while the court
upheld the right of the county to sell the mineral estate for unpaid ad
valorem taxes, it also stressed that those minerals, when severed, must
be “properly assessed and sold for the payment of taxes” in order to
“convey good title to the minerals.”77
While by no means a direct repudiation of Hutchinson v. Kline, the
F. H. Rockwell decision does support the fact that the court was con-
cerned with what real property was being assessed, taxed, and sold at
tax sales, and further, believed certain limitations existed to safeguard
the fairness of that process. The court found it important to emphasize
that a severed mineral estate must be valued properly in order for
good title to the mineral estate to be passed at a subsequent tax sale,
and provided some rough examples of how proper assessment could
be made.
73. Id. at 666.
74. As previously noted, this is no longer the law in Pennsylvania. See supra text
accompanying notes 60–63. R
75. F. H. Rockwell, 77 A. at 666.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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B. Armstrong v. Black Fox Mining & Development Corp.
In Armstrong v. Black Fox,78 the Court of Common Pleas rejected
outright the notion that a failure to separately assess severed mineral
rights could vest title in a tax-sale purchaser of the surface estate.
There, the plaintiffs brought an action for trespass against Black Fox
Mining & Development Corporation (“Black Fox”) for removing and
selling coal on two adjacent parcels of land in Armstrong County,
Pennsylvania, to which the plaintiffs claimed ownership.79 In 1903, the
coal rights were severed from the surface estates of both parcels of
land and conveyed in separate transactions to the same new owners.80
After multiple conveyances, the coal estates eventually passed to the
plaintiffs.81
The surface estate of the smaller fifty-four acre tract remained in
possession of the grantor who originally severed and conveyed the
coal rights from the surface estate until it was eventually sold for de-
linquent taxes in 1963 to Arthur and Nancy Duppstadt.82 The Dupp-
stadts entered into a strip-mining lease with Black Fox for the coal—
an act which the plaintiffs claimed was not within the Duppstadts’
power because the coal rights had been previously severed and con-
veyed to other owners in 1903.83
Black Fox asserted, among other things, that the coal ownership of
the fifty-four acre tract had not been properly assessed for taxation as
separate from the surface estate, and therefore title to the entire prop-
erty passed to the Duppstadts at the 1963 tax sale.84 The court re-
jected this argument, explaining that even if the coal rights were not
separately assessed, “this does not in any way vest title in the Dupp-
stadts.”85 The court continued:
A tax sale for delinquent taxes conveys only that estate owned by
the titleholder and covered by the assessment . . . .  If the coal rights
in the 54 acre tract were not separately assessed, this is a matter
between the taxing authorities and the owner of the coal estate. A
purchaser at a tax sale of the surface estate would not be able to
rely on this to claim he purchased the coal estate as well.86
78. Armstrong v. Black Fox Mining & Dev. Corp., 15 Pa. D. & C.3d 757 (Ct. Com.
Pl. 1980).
79. Id. at 757–58.
80. Id. at 758–59.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 759. The Duppstadts were joined by Black Fox as defendants in the
action. Id.
83. Armstrong, 15 Pa. D. & C.3d at 760.
84. Id. at 762.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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Thus, the court curtly rejected Black Fox’s tax sale title wash conten-
tion, finding title to the coal estate was still properly vested in the
plaintiffs.87
C. Day v. Johnson
Day v. Johnson,88 another Court of Common Pleas decision, also
focused on the importance of the existence of a taxable mineral estate
and a proper assessment of that estate in order for a tax sale to pass
title. In 1923, John A. Day sold a 100-acre tract of unseated land in
Warren County, Pennsylvania but reserved the mineral rights for him-
self.89 Neither he nor his grandson—the sole successor to the mineral
estate—ever removed or attempted to remove any minerals from the
tract, nor was the mineral estate ever submitted for separate assess-
ment and taxation.90 Day’s grandson filed a quiet title action against
several defendants who were claiming ownership of the mineral rights
on the basis of a 1934 tax sale of the surface estate.91 The defendants,
relying in part on Hutchinson v. Kline, claimed that Day’s failure to
have the mineral estate separately assessed according to the mandate
of the Act of 28 March, 1806 divested him of the reserved mineral
estate.92
The court acknowledged the Hutchinson v. Kline holding,93 but was
more persuaded by the F. H. Rockwell court’s conclusion, which de-
scribed the requirements for taxing real property, in particular min-
eral estates.94 To the Day v. Johnson court, it was only logical that if a
mineral estate was not assessed—albeit in contravention of the Act of
28 March, 1806—it could not be properly charged with taxes, nor con-
sequently delinquent in such taxes, and thus title to the mineral estate
could not possibly have passed at the 1934 county treasurer’s sale. The
court further admonished:
The sole purpose of sale of delinquent taxes is to collect the taxes
for the operation of the county and not to deprive the owner of his
property. The assessment for tax purposes of the subsurface rights is
on the production of the [minerals] from the subsurface not upon an
estate where it cannot be determined the valuation thereof. In our
opinion the mere creation of an exception and reservation without
the operation for the removal of the minerals does not create a tax-
able estate per se and would not until production is had therefrom
87. Id. at 763.
88. Day v. Johnson, 31 Pa. D. & C.3d 556 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1983).
89. Id. at 557.
90. Id. at 557–58.
91. Id. at 557.  The tax sale was based on a 1931 assessment that described the
premises as “100 acres, Brokenstraw Township.” Id.
92. Day, 31 Pa. D. & C.3d at 559.
93. Id.
94. See supra text accompanying note 73.
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWR\2-3\TWR307.txt unknown Seq: 16  4-DEC-15 10:47
548 TEXAS A&M J. OF PROP. L. [Vol. 2
and properly assessed in value. If this were not so the taxing author-
ity could simply assess taxation on speculation as to value.95
The defendants filed seven exceptions to the decision, the thrust of
which again raised the issue of Day’s failure to inform the taxing au-
thorities of the mineral estate reservation.96 The court responded that,
while a mineral reservation of unseated land was a taxable entity, no
proper assessment could be made on that estate until production of
the minerals commenced.97 Any attempt to assess the mineral estate
for ad valorem taxes in the absence of bringing those minerals to the
surface and giving them a market valuation would be “an exercise of
clairvoyance.”98
D. The Federal Court Cases
When discussing Pennsylvania title wash jurisprudence, one cannot
avoid two major federal district court cases, both of which were af-
firmed on appeal by the Third Circuit and are cited frequently in min-
eral estate title disputes. Prior to the 2014 Herder Spring decision,
Proctor v. Sagamore Big Game Club99 is arguably the only case since
Hutchinson v. Kline to endorse major concepts involved with the tax
sale title wash.
1. Proctor v. Sagamore Big Game Club
In Proctor v. Sagamore, the plaintiffs claimed ownership of the nat-
ural gas rights to a 1,100-acre parcel of unseated land in Elk County,
Pennsylvania, and filed an ejectment action in 1954 against defendants
who had removed millions of dollars of natural gas from beneath the
tract.100  Both parties moved for summary judgment.101  The plaintiffs
claimed title to the natural gas by chaining their title back to Thomas
E. Proctor, who acquired the 1,100-acre parcel from W. D. Bigler in
1893, and then conveyed the surface estate to Elk Tanning Company
on October 1, 1894, while reserving the mineral rights for himself.102
The defendants argued, however, that because the taxes on Bigler’s
unseated parcel went unpaid for 1892 and 1893, and the tract was then
sold at a county tax sale on June 11, 1894, Proctor had been effectively
divested of his title and thus had nothing to convey or reserve when he
granted the surface estate to Elk Tanning Company on October 1,
1894.103
95. Day, 31 Pa. D. & C.3d at 558.
96. Id. at 562.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. 166 F. Supp. 465 (W.D. Pa. 1958), aff’d, 265 F.2d 196 (3d Cir. 1959).
100. Id. at 467.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 470.
103. Id. at 468–70.
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The United States District Court for the Western District of Penn-
sylvania sided with the defendants, agreeing that the June 1894 tax
sale of the 1,100-acre parcel was valid, and Proctor’s conveyance and
reservation several months later effectively transferred nothing.104
The Third Circuit affirmed this reasoning, holding that “when Proctor
gave his deed to Elk Tanning Company, he had no legal title in the
surface to convey . . . or in the natural gas to reserve to himself.  The
reservation could not revive in Proctor the legal title which he had lost
by the earlier tax sale.”105
A critical issue in Proctor v. Sagamore is that both the assessment of
the unseated land and the resultant tax sale based on this assessment,
which divested Proctor of his legal title, took place before Proctor sev-
ered and conveyed the surface and subsurface estates.106  So while the
district court upheld the principle that a valid tax sale of unseated land
for previously unpaid taxes could divest a new legal owner of title,
commentators are quick to point out that because the assessment and
tax sale occurred prior to severance, a feature also present in Powell v.
Lantzy,107 these two oft-cited Pennsylvania cases are of limited value
in the dispute over the validity of the purported rejoining of previ-
ously severed surface and mineral estates through a subsequent as-
sessment and tax sale for the unseated surface property.108
2. New York State Natural Gas Corp. v. Swan-Finch
Gas Development Corp.
The second major federal case, New York State Natural Gas Corp.
v. Swan-Finch Gas Development Corp.,109 was decided by the same
district court only a year after Proctor v. Sagamore.110 There, both the
plaintiffs and the defendants agreed on the common source of title for
a 1,050-acre tract of unseated land in Clearfield County, Pennsylvania,
but disagreed as to the ownership of the natural gas rights after an
1887 severance and conveyance of the mineral estate to Caledonia
Coal Company.111 The defendants chained their title back to Caledo-
nia Coal Company, claiming the initial 1887 conveyance of the min-
eral estate presumptively included the natural gas, and alternatively,
they acquired the natural gas rights through a treasurer’s sale for un-
paid taxes on the mineral estate for the1896 and 1897 tax years.112
104. Id. at 470.
105. Proctor v. Sagamore Big Game Club, 265 F.2d 196, 201 (3d Cir. 1959).
106. See Proctor v. Sagamore Big Game Club, 166 F. Supp. 465, 468–69 (W.D. Pa.
1958).
107. See supra text accompanying notes 34–40. R
108. See, e.g., Hicks & Oberdick, supra note 33, at 21–22.
109. N.Y. State Natural Gas Corp. v. Swan-Finch Gas Dev. Corp., 173 F. Supp. 184
(W.D. Pa. 1959), aff’d, 278 F.2d 577 (3d Cir. 1960).
110. See id. at 191.
111. Id. at 185–86.
112. Id. at 186.
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The defendants’ first claim—that the 1887 mineral estate deed to
Caledonia Coal Company containing the words “and other minerals
of every kind and character” presumptively included natural gas—was
rejected by the district court, which instead sided squarely with the
long-held Pennsylvania jurisprudence that natural gas is not presumed
to be included in such private conveyance language.113
The defendants alternatively argued that the 1898 tax sale of the
mineral estate had divested the plaintiffs’ predecessors-in-title of their
natural gas rights.114 In this case, the surface estate and mineral estate
had been separately assessed for approximately eight years—the sur-
face estate assessed to the grantor and the mineral estate assessed to
Caledonia Coal Company—and both estates were sold separately at
an 1898 treasurer’s sale for unpaid 1896 and 1897 ad valorem taxes.115
The defendants, whose chain of title included the purchaser of the
mineral estate at the 1898 tax sale, claimed the assessments identified
as “mineral” and charged to Caledonia Coal Company necessarily in-
cluded the natural gas because no separate assessment had been made
on the natural gas rights retained by the surface owner after the sever-
ance.116 Therefore, defendants contended, the mineral assessments
and resultant tax sale must have included the natural gas rights,117 and
thus conveyed good title to those rights to the mineral estate tax sale
purchaser.118
The plaintiffs, on the other hand, claimed that only those minerals
that were conveyed to Caledonia Coal Company in the 1887 deed
passed at the 1898 mineral estate tax, and nothing more.119  Since the
natural gas rights were not included in the severance and conveyance
to Caledonia Coal Company in 1887, they necessarily remained in the
surface owner; could not have been included in the mineral estate as-
sessments and tax sale; and were therefore sold to the 1898 tax sale
purchaser of the surface estate, who was a link in plaintiffs’ chain of
title.120
The district court agreed with the plaintiffs, reasoning that the natu-
ral gas could not have been included in the “mineral” assessment and
resultant tax sale as “[t]hat was not a property right which passed to
Caledonia Coal Company in its deed.”121  The court went on to ex-
plain that, while there had never been a separate assessment of the
113. Id. at 186–88; see also supra note 2.
114. N.Y. State Natural Gas Corp., 173 F. Supp. at 186.
115. Id. at 189–90.
116. Id. at 190–91.
117. The defendants claimed this was so even if, perhaps, the assessor mistakenly
included the natural gas interest in the mineral assessments. See N.Y. State Natural
Gas Corp. v. Swan-Finch Gas Dev. Corp., 278 F.2d 577, 579 (3d Cir. 1960).
118. Id.
119. N.Y. State Natural Gas Corp., 173 F. Supp. at 191.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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natural gas rights—rights that the court determined were retained by
the surface estate owner after severance—
[T]he mere naked conveyance or reservation of oil or gas in a deed
without other facts to base a valuation upon is not sufficient to war-
rant the assessment for taxes . . . .  [A]n owner does not lose title by
virtue of failure to have his gas assessed.  Any failure to have prop-
erty assessed might be the subject of contention between the taxing
authorities and the owner, but does not assist a stranger to the title
claiming ownership.122
On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed.123  Addressing the defend-
ants’ (there, appellants’) argument, which was grounded in Hutchin-
son v. Kline, that the 1898 tax sale divested the surface estate owner of
the natural gas rights because the natural gas had never been sepa-
rately assessed; the court relied on F. H. Rockwell to conclude that,124
absent some affirmative showing that the general mineral assessments
charged to Caledonia Coal Company included natural gas, the pur-
chaser of the mineral estate at the 1898 tax sale could not have ac-
quired the natural gas rights.125
In order for the natural gas rights to justifiably pass at the 1898
mineral estate tax sale, the court explained, there had to be “some
reason to believe at the time of the assessments in question that gas of
commercial potential was present . . . and that it had value which
could be estimated.”126 Because natural gas was not even considered
to be accessible in this area until very recently,127 the general mineral
assessments on which the 1898 mineral estate tax sale was based were
not intended to, nor did they, include the natural gas rights.128
Swan-Finch, like Proctor v. Sagamore, is factually distinguishable
from the Hutchinson v. Kline and Herder Spring concept of a tax-sale
title wash serving to rejoin previously severed surface and mineral es-
tates. In Swan-Finch, there were separate assessments for the surface
and mineral estates, and each were separately sold at the 1898 trea-
surer’s sale. It is important to note, however, that both the district
court and the Third Circuit were at odds with the idea of a tax sale
divesting a record owner of a reserved property interest simply be-
cause the owner failed to have that right separately assessed. In these
federal judges’ opinions, that was not enough. A tax sale could only
122. Id. at 192–93 (citing F. H. Rockwell & Co. v. Warren Cnty., 77 A. 665, 666 (Pa.
1910)).
123. N.Y. State Natural Gas Corp. v. Swan-Finch Gas Dev. Corp., 278 F.2d 577, 580
(3d Cir. 1960).
124. F. H. Rockwell, 77 A. at 666; see also supra text accompanying note 73.
125. Swan-Finch, 278 F.2d at 579.
126. Id. at 580.
127. Hydraulic fracturing was not invented until 1949, only eleven years prior to the
Third Circuit’s Swan-Finch decision. See id.
128. Id.
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pass what had been clearly and properly assessed.129 Failure to sepa-
rately assess a reserved property interest was only fatal if the assess-
ment used in the subsequent tax sale included proper assessment of
that interest.130
E. Herder Spring Hunting Club v. Keller
As one can see, Pennsylvania and related federal jurisprudence fol-
lowing Hutchinson v. Kline almost unanimously moved away from the
principles of the title wash theory that a tax sale of unseated surface
land could rejoin previously severed surface and mineral estates and
divest a mineral estate owner of a duly-recorded property interest that
was not separately reported and assessed.  It seemed as though devel-
opments in notice requirements, the treatment of unseated land for
taxation purposes, and ad valorem taxation of mineral rights had mod-
ernized the court’s approach to this issue of Pennsylvania property
law. Herder Spring,131 however, marked a drastic about-face in this
modern trend.132
Not only did the Herder Spring court reaffirm Hutchinson v.
Kline,133 it essentially established—as a matter of law—that if an un-
seated tract was severed into separate surface and mineral estates, and
the owner of the newly-created mineral estate did not report the prop-
erty interest to the taxing authorities as required by the Act of 28
March, 1806, any subsequent assessment of the unseated parcel—ab-
sent some specific reference in the assessment to the contrary—neces-
sarily included the entire estate.134  Accordingly, any county
treasurer’s sale based on that assessment was a valid sale of the whole
property (both surface and subsurface rights).135
The Herder Spring court further rebutted the premise raised in the
federal decisions that since there had been no valuation of the mineral
129. Swan-Finch, 278 F.2d at 579 (“the Hutchinson [v. Kline] case recognizes and is
predicated upon the well-established rule that a tax deed conveys only such interest as
was actually assessed”).
130. See id. at 579–80; N.Y. State Natural Gas Corp. v. Swan-Finch Gas Dev. Corp.,
173 F. Supp. 184, 192–93 (W.D. Pa. 1959).
131. Herder Spring Hunting Club v. Keller, 93 A.3d 465 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2014), peti-
tion for allowance of appeal granted, 108 A.3d 1279 (Pa. 2015).
132. For a factual background of Herder Spring Hunting Club v. Keller, see supra
text accompanying notes 1, 3–7. R
133. Herder Spring, 93 A.3d at 471.
134. “If information regarding the severance of rights to unseated property is not
given to the commissioners, then any tax assessment for that unseated property must
logically be based upon the property as a whole.” Id. at 472 (emphasis added); see also
id. at 469 (“[I]f the county commissioners have not been informed of the severance of
surface and subsurface rights, the tax assessment is levied against the property as a
whole.”).
135. Herder Spring, 93 A.3d at 472 (“If a parcel of unseated land was valued as a
whole, and the taxes on that land were not paid, thereby subjecting that property to
seizure and tax sale, then all that was valued, surface and subsurface rights, were [sic]
sold pursuant to any tax sale . . . .”).
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rights, there could be no proper tax assessment of them, and thus they
could not be sold at a subsequent tax sale for delinquent taxes.136  The
court admonished, “[T]he import of the Act [of 28 March, 1806] is
that it allows the tax assessors the opportunity to independently assess
a value to severed rights. . . .  One cannot say the mineral rights were
never valued when the commissioners were not given the opportunity
to independently value them.”137
V. CLEANING UP THE TITLE WASH
Decisions such as Armstrong v. Black Fox and Day v. Johnson are
directly at odds with Herder Spring.  For the Armstrong and Day
courts, a failure to separately assess severed mineral rights could not
possibly subject such interests to a tax sale, as a proper assessment was
a logical prerequisite for any property interest to pass at a tax sale for
unpaid ad valorem taxes.  A failure to report simply could not vest
title in a stranger who purchased the surface estate at a tax sale.  The
Herder Spring court, on the other hand, decided that if a severance of
the mineral rights was never reported for separate assessment (or
could not be proven to have been reported), whatever assessment was
made on the land and used at a subsequent tax sale necessarily was for
the entire unseated property.138 And, absent some affirmative proof
to the contrary, good title for the whole property passed to the tax
sale purchaser.139
The federal court cases attempting to apply Pennsylvania law do
little to clarify the murky waters of this peculiar property issue.  First,
as previously explained, the Proctor v. Sagamore decision dealt with a
136. Id. at 472 n.11.
137. Id. (Pa. Super. Ct. 2014). The Herder Spring court further claimed that the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had addressed this issue in Bannard v. N.Y. State
Natural Gas Corp., 293 A.2d 41 (1972). Id. In Bannard, the court explained that a
disagreement about what was properly valued—coal, clay, oil, natural gas, and/or
other minerals—in a particular mineral assessment should be disputed at the time of
the assessment with the taxing authorities, not “collaterally attacked fifty years later.”
Bannard, 293 A.2d at 49. It should be noted, however, that while the Herder Spring
court concluded that the Bannard court addressed and rejected the argument that a
severed mineral estate that was never separately assessed could not be sold at a tax
sale for delinquent property taxes, in reality the Bannard court only addressed the
narrow issue of what was presumptively included in a general “mineral” assessment
for conveyance and tax sale purposes. Id. at 48–49. The Bannard court explained that
if the intention of the parties to a mineral estate conveyance clearly indicated that the
mineral estate included oil and natural gas, a subsequent general “mineral” assess-
ment utilized for tax sale purposes necessarily included the oil and natural gas. Id. at
47–49. If no oil and natural gas actually existed when these assessments were made,
such a disagreement should be made to the taxing authorities at the time of the over-
valuation, not at a title dispute fifty years later; otherwise, there could be “protracted
collateral investigation and litigation” about what was actually assessed and trans-
ferred in every mineral estate tax sale. Id. at 49.
138. See Herder Spring, 93 A.3d at 469, 472; see also supra notes 134–35. R
139. Herder Spring, 93 A.3d at 472–73.
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distinguishable factual situation in which an entire unseated property,
prior to any severance, was assessed and sold at a tax sale for delin-
quent taxes.140  The Swan-Finch district and circuit courts then re-
jected the idea that failure to report a severed property interest, in
and of itself, was fatal to an ownership claim.141  Rather, these courts
admonished, one claiming title to a severed property interest through
a tax sale must affirmatively show that the property interest in dispute
was properly included in the assessment(s) used in the subsequent tax
sale.142  Only then did the property interest pass to the tax-sale pur-
chaser through the treasurer’s deed.143
It has been over 100 years since Hutchinson v. Kline—the last Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court case to arguably address the issue of whether
a tax sale for unseated surface land can rejoin a previously severed
and recorded mineral estate, thereby divesting the record mineral
owner of his legal property interest.  The time is ripe for the Supreme
Court to revisit this issue and, as this Article argues, to move away
from outdated and unfair legal principles that are no longer relevant
to Pennsylvania property and tax law. The court needs to establish a
consistent and more equitable method for resolving these peculiar and
complicated title disputes.
This Article proposes a rule that would begin with a rebuttable pre-
sumption that a general assessment and resultant tax sale for unpaid
real estate taxes on unseated land, prior to the 1947 changes in Penn-
sylvania ad valorem taxation laws,144 included the entire property.
Those claiming ownership of the subsurface mineral rights would be
able to rebut this presumption and prove superior title in one of two
ways.
First, no mineral rights would be considered to have passed at the
tax sale if the claimant could affirmatively prove that the assessment
on which the tax sale of the surface estate was based was not an as-
sessment of the whole property. Such proof would include any indica-
tion on the tax sale assessment showing only the surface was assessed;
any proof that a separate assessment was requested and, or completed
for the mineral estate after severance; or any proof that taxes for the
mineral estate were charged to, or paid by, the record mineral estate
owner. This is not a controversial concept, and generally comports
with most of the title wash jurisprudence to date, as it is well estab-
lished that only the estate that is assessed passes at a tax sale.145
140. See supra notes 100–08 and accompanying text. R
141. See supra notes 122, 124–28 and accompanying text. R
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. See supra text accompanying notes 54–59. R
145. See N.Y. State Natural Gas Corp. v. Swan-Finch Gas Dev. Corp., 173 F. Supp.
184, 191 (W.D. Pa. 1959), aff’d, 278 F.2d 577 (3d Cir. 1960) (“it is but elementary that
only the estate assessed passes at a tax sale”); Babcock Lumber Co. v. Faust, 39 A.2d
298, 302 (1944) (“lien for unpaid taxes attaches only to the estate assessed, and that
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The second option is that a claimant could rebut the presumption of
the minerals passing at the tax sale of the surface estate by affirma-
tively proving that a valid severance and recording of the mineral es-
tate was made prior to the assessment and tax sale that purportedly
rejoined the severed estates.146 This could include, for example, a
properly recorded severance and conveyance of the mineral estate to
a new owner, or a severance and reservation of the mineral rights in a
conveyance of the surface estate.
Concededly, this second alternative would be a change from the
current understanding of Pennsylvania law.  As it presently stands,
earlier court decisions have largely rejected the idea of relying on the
recording process to prove ownership in tax sale title disputes.  In
Hutchinson v. Kline, the court explained that recording the reserva-
tion of mineral rights was not notice to the assessors, and did not pro-
tect the mineral estate owner of divestment at a subsequent tax sale if
the taxing authorities were not informed of the newly-created estate
in accordance with the Act of 28 March, 1806.147  The Herder Spring
court adopted this reasoning.148  There are, however, strong argu-
ments for implementing this change.
A. Intent of the Legislature and Severity of Divestment
There is considerable weight to the contention that the Act of 28
March, 1806 was enacted to raise revenue for the counties, not to
divest mineral estate owners, who had taken due care to properly re-
cord, of their property interest.149  It is well settled in Pennsylvania
that the purpose of tax sales is to raise revenue, not to extinguish
property rights.150
This argument is bolstered by the fact that the Act itself provided a
four-fold penalty for failing to comply with the reporting and assess-
estate, but no more, passes at a public sale even though the authorities assume to
convey land against which there had been no valid assessment”).
146. This second option tracks Pennsylvania recording law, insofar as Pennsylvania
does not have a Marketable Title Act that would automatically extinguish title defects
more than a certain number of years old. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1115 (10th
ed. 2014) (defining marketable title act as “[a] state statute providing that a person
can establish good title to land by searching the public records only back to a specified
time (such as 40 years)”); see also NANCY SAINT-PAUL, CLEARING LAND TITLES § 5
(3d ed. 2014) (providing comprehensive, updated list of states that have some form of
marketable title act; Pennsylvania is not included).
147. See Hutchinson v. Kline, 49 A. 312, 318 (Pa. 1901).
148. Herder Spring Hunting Club v. Keller, 93 A.3d 465, 471 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2014).
149. See Hicks & Oberdick, supra note 33, at 18–19.
150. See, e.g., Tracy v. Chester Cnty. Tax Claim Bureau, 489 A.2d 1334, 1339 (Pa.
1985) (“[t]he purpose of tax sales is not to strip the taxpayer of his property but to
insure the collection of taxes.”) (quoting Hess v. Westerwick, 76 A.2d 745 (Pa. 1950));
Albert v. Lehigh Coal & Navigation Co., 246 A.2d 840, 846 (Pa. 1968) (accord); Potter
Cnty. v. Heinrich, 183 A.2d 726, 727 (Pa. 1962) (accord); March v. Banus, 151 A.2d
612, 616 (Pa. 1959) (“The purpose of tax sales is to collect taxes, not to drive a man
from his property.”) (citing In re Ross, 76 A.2d 749 (Pa. 1950)).
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ment mandate.151  The Herder Spring court, citing no evidence other
than its own reasoning, dismissed the four-fold tax penalty argument
in a footnote.152  It reasoned that since the penalty was available when
the Hutchinson v. Kline and Roaring Creek decisions were issued,153
but was not applied by those courts, the penalty must have been im-
posed only in instances where the land had not been sold at a tax
sale.154
But the previously mentioned Day v. Johnson, Armstrong v. Black
Fox, and Swan-Finch courts, however, support the idea that tax sales
were not meant to divest an unknowing record owner of his property
interest.  To those courts, a dispute about whether a separate assess-
ment was properly made should be settled with the taxing authorities,
not by vesting ownership in a stranger to the title.  Perhaps the best
summation of the argument for enforcing the four-fold tax penalty, as
opposed to stripping record owners of their property interests for fail-
ure to comport with the Act of 28 March, 1806, is found in City of
Philadelphia v. Miller155:
Owners of unseated lands are for the most part non-residents, far
away from their property.  Under these circumstances, to erect the
high standard of diligence thus set up for us, where the penalty of its
non-observance is so greatly disproportioned, as is the loss of a
man’s whole estate to the pittance of tax imposed upon it, is to exact
a duty most onerous, and higher than the law itself has given us.
The penalty of the law for a failure to make a return of land for
taxation is fourfold taxation, but not confiscation of estate.  We
should not be wiser than the law.156
Even in the cases that pre-date Hutchinson, which are often cited by
proponents of the title wash, the courts emphasize that stripping a re-
cord owner of his property interest is a drastic, and in some circum-
stances, unjust result.  For instance, in Williston v. Colkett,157 the
owner of a newly created 600-acre unseated parcel knowingly paid
taxes on only 200 acres—as the taxing authorities mistakenly included
151. See Act of 28 March, 1806 § 1, 4 SM. L. 346 (repealed and replaced by 72 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 5020–409) (“on failure of any holder of unseated lands to comply with
. . . this act, it shall be the duty of the county commissioners to assess on every tract of
land . . . four times the amount of the tax to which such tract or tracts of and would
have been otherwise liable”).
152. See Herder Spring, 93 A.3d at 471 n.10.
153. Roaring Creek Water Co. v. Northumberland Cnty. Comm’rs, 6 Pa. C. 473 (Ct.
Com. Pl. 1889).
154. Herder Spring, 93 A.3d at 471 n.10.
155. Philadelphia v. Miller, 49 Pa. 440, 450 (1865).
156. Id. at 450. See also Hicks & Oberdick, supra note 33, at 23 n.92 (“The law does
not confiscate a man’s land although he does not return it to the commissioners, and
they do not know of it and do not tax it. The Act of 1806 directs that if land is not
returned by the owner and not taxed, a fourfold tax may be assessed on it when
discovered; this penalty may be imposed, but no other.”) (quoting Strauch v. Shoe-
maker, 1 Watts & Serg. 166, 178 (Pa. 1841) (Huston, J., dissenting)).
157. Williston v. Colkett, 9 Pa. 38, 38 (1848).
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only 200 acres in their assessment—instead of notifying the county
commissioner, in accordance with the Act of 28 March, 1806, that he
was responsible for three times the acreage.158 Subsequently, the land
underwent a treasurer’s sale for unpaid taxes, with the treasurer’s
deed showing 200 acres sold.159  The court, notwithstanding the trea-
surer’s deed, held that all 600 acres had been transferred by the tax
sale due to the owner’s failure to properly report and assess the prop-
erty.160  It is telling that the court spent nearly the entire opinion em-
phasizing that the owner’s knowing and willful misconduct justified
the harsh result of divestment of his legal property interest.161
In 1889, in the Roaring Creek case, also cited with approval by the
Herder Spring court, the Court of Common Pleas judge acknowledged
in dicta that under current law a general assessment and tax sale of
unseated land would pass title to the surface and subsurface estates
regardless of separate record ownership.162  While he conceded that
the taxing authorities were not legally required to take notice of the
titles of the parties, doing so, he concluded, would “doubtless . . . be
convenient and just to them.”163
B. Record Notice is Notice to the World
Just as the Roaring Creek court suggested, recognizing properly-re-
corded titles would impart a measure of fairness and justice into the
title wash system.  While the law clearly did not require taxing author-
ities to perform title searches, this does not mean that it would be
unfair to expect more from those purchasing or leasing real estate in-
terests, especially in modern times. Recording a deed containing a
severance of the surface and mineral estates, after all, is “constructive
notice to all the world of the fact of severance.”164
Record notice becomes particularly important when considering not
just the historical perpetration of widespread fraud,165 but also the
troubling factual situations like in Herder Spring. There, a sophisti-
cated buyer of unseated surface property, with full knowledge of the
previous severance of the mineral estate, cavalierly leased the mineral
158. Id. at 38–39.
159. Id. at 39.
160. Id.
161. Id. In an effort to highlight the owner’s intentional tax fraud, the court de-
scribed his conduct with phrases like, “[h]e was silent for his own advantage, when
truth and the interest of the public required him to speak,” and “he has brought the
evil on himself.” Id. at 39.
162. Roaring Creek Water Co. v. Northumberland Cnty. Comm’rs, 6 Pa. C.C. 473,
476 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1889).
163. Id.
164. Del. & Hudson Canal Co. v. Hughes, 183 Pa. 66, 70 (1897). Constructive no-
tice through proper recording is widely recognized as “just as effectual for the protec-
tion of the rights of the parties as an actual notice by word of mouth or otherwise.” 66
AM. JUR. 2D Records & Recording Laws § 75 (1964).
165. See supra text accompanying note 44.
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rights and then sued to quiet title, relying—not illogically—on the
purported reunification of the previously severed estates through a
tax-sale title wash.  There is something fundamentally wrong with a
system that rewards this type of behavior with superior title.  But the
Herder Spring court interpreted the current state of Pennsylvania law
to allow just such a result.
Instead of stripping unknowing mineral estate owners, like the Kel-
ler heirs, of duly recorded property interests, the onus should be on
the buyer or lessee to exert due diligence by performing a detailed
title search, and—just as when purchasing entire real property—to be
required to respect properly recorded severed interests.  Even though
the task may require more effort due to the historically disparate
treatment of seated and unseated land,166 performing an accurate and
diligent title search is far from impossible.167 Moreover, many of the
modern purchasers or lessees are large oil and gas companies, with
more than sufficient resources to hire experienced and competent title
attorneys.
C. Accurate Assessments and Changes in Oil and Gas Law
Finally, one cannot discuss the divestment of duly recorded mineral
rights through a tax sale without confronting the thorny issue of just
how an assessment was made, and what was properly assessed and
therefore sold at a treasurer’s sale. As mentioned above, it is well set-
tled in Pennsylvania that a “lien for unpaid taxes attaches only to the
estate assessed, and that estate, but no more, passes at a public
sale.”168  But how would an assessor in the 1800s or early 1900s, mak-
ing a visual assessment on unseated land, be able to properly include a
value on the minerals beneath the surface?
This question is magnified in a region where the most valuable min-
eral—natural gas—could not be extracted in a commercially viable
way until the development of hydraulic fracturing in 1949,169 a process
166. Because ad valorem taxes for unseated land historically were assessed against
the land itself, see supra text accompanying notes 19–22, tax deeds for unseated land R
in title chains often will not provide the name of the previous owner, but will instead
describe the land according to the original warrants, thus requiring a title examiner to
go back to the initial land warrants and chain the mineral interests forward. See
Michael K. Vennum & Grant H. Hackley, Recognizing New Issues Arising Out of the
Marcellus Shale Development—Avoiding Pitfalls—A Primer for Diligent Oil and Gas
Title Attorneys, 84 PA. B. ASS’N Q. 25, 33 (2013). Furthermore, if land was determined
to be unseated for taxation purposes, it was to be recorded in separate unseated land
books that were kept by most counties, which must be reviewed to determine the
status of the land during pre-1947 conveyances. See id.
167. See, e.g., Vennum & Hackley, supra note 166, at 33 (providing step-by-step R
title search instructions for the “diligent title attorney” when dealing with real estate
that may have been affected by a title wash).
168. Babcock Lumber Co. v. Faust, 39 A.2d 298, 302 (1944).
169. N.Y. State Natural Gas Corp. v. Swan-Finch Gas Dev. Corp., 278 F.2d 577, 580
(3d Cir. 1960).
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that was not economically feasible in Pennsylvania until very re-
cently.170 Thus, one cannot help but wonder how a basic, general as-
sessment of unseated land at that time could have valued the
subsurface minerals in any meaningful way.171 This particular dilemma
pokes a rather gaping hole in the Herder Spring court’s argument that
“[o]ne cannot say the mineral rights were never valued when the com-
missioners were not given the opportunity to independently value
them.”172 Even if presented with such an opportunity, how could the
county commissioners at that time possibly have made a meaningful
valuation and assessment of a mineral estate—particularly oil and nat-
ural gas interests—in order for the estate to then be sold at treasurer’s
sale?
Some courts have recognized this conundrum deciding that a proper
valuation, specifically of minerals like oil and natural gas, was impossi-
ble at the time the assessments in question were made. Thus, it would
be logically inconsistent to say that such property interests passed at a
subsequent tax sale.173 This valuation difficulty also appears to be
what concerned the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in F. H.
Rockwell, where it warned that a mere “naked reservation” of miner-
als rights would not be sufficient to mandate property taxes; there had
to be some logical method of valuation in order for taxes to be levied
on those interests.174
The Herder Spring court’s answer to this issue was simply to pre-
sume that any general assessment of unseated land, absent affirmative
proof to the contrary, included the entire estate; was a valid and accu-
rate assessment of the entire property unless challenged at the time it
was made; and thus passed the entire estate at a subsequent trea-
surer’s sale for unpaid taxes. This solution, however tidy it may ap-
pear, raises serious concerns about fairness to the record mineral
estate owners.
First, as some commentators have noted, absence of an assessment
or proof of taxes paid does not necessarily mean notice was not pro-
vided to the taxing authorities: “[I]t is equally plausible that the requi-
site notice was given but no taxable estate existed because the county
170. See generally Robinson Twp., Washington Cnty., PA v. Commonwealth of Pa.,
83 A.3d 901, 914 (Pa. 2013) (explaining that Marcellus Shale natural gas production in
Pennsylvania commenced in 2005).
171. That is, unless circumstances existed like those described in F.H. Rockwell:
“[d]evelopment in the neighborhood, sales of oil or gas lands in close enough proxim-
ity to add value, or any other element of value which may form a basis of valuation.”
F. H. Rockwell & Co. v. Warren Cnty., 77 A. 665, 666 (Pa. 1910).
172. Herder Spring Hunting Club v. Keller, 93 A.3d 465, 472 n.11 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2014).
173. See, e.g., Day v. Johnson, 31 Pa. D. & C.3d 556, 562 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1983) (trying
to put a value on subsurface minerals like oil and natural gas, without bringing them
to the surface and giving them a market valuation, would be an “exercise in
clairvoyance”).
174. F. H. Rockwell, 77 A. at 666.
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. . . lacked a sufficient basis to value such interests.”175  Thus, it is
entirely conceivable that taxes may not have been assessed against a
mineral estate because there simply was no basis for levying those
taxes.  But the Herder Spring decision completely ignores this poten-
tial scenario.  Instead, the court attempts to create a virtually per se
rule that recorded, severed mineral interests, which lack affirmative
proof of separate assessment or taxation, will pass at a subsequent
treasurer’s sale of the surface estate as long as that sale is based on a
general assessment of the unseated land.
Second, the understanding and laws concerning ad valorem taxation
of oil and natural gas interests have dramatically changed in Penn-
sylvania.176 Courts have realized that it makes little sense to assess
taxes on these subsurface minerals that exist in potentially unknown
quantities—the value of which can fluctuate drastically—until actual
extraction of those minerals.177 Punishing record mineral estate own-
ers by divestment of their property interest for allegedly not reporting
or paying taxes on minerals that are nearly impossible to value or as-
sess until extracted is anathema to both current law and common
sense. As understanding and laws progress, there must be a compel-
ling reason why the treatment of historical property law issues should
not follow suit.
Many of the concerns with revising the contours of the title wash
center around upsetting years of Pennsylvania property and tax juris-
prudence.178 These concerns, however, can be addressed in the same
manner in which the IOGA court reversed the long-held rule that oil
and natural gas were considered “land” for ad valorem taxation: apply
the new rule prospectively only.
175. Hicks & Oberdick, supra note 33, at 25.
176. See supra text accompanying notes 54–63. R
177. Until the IOGA decision in 2002, the rule of law in Pennsylvania was that
minerals like coal, oil, and natural gas, even when simply lying dormant, were consid-
ered taxable real estate as long as they had value. See F. H. Rockwell & Co. v. Warren
Cnty., 77 A. 665, 665 (Pa. 1910) (“oil, gas, and coal are minerals, and, when the title to
the same is severed from the owner of the surface and is vested in a separate owner,
an estate in land is thus created, which if it be of any value, may be taxed”). Thus,
since F. H. Rockwell and until IOGA, local governments had been taxing oil and gas
interests and relying on the revenues produced.  Oz Gas, Ltd. v. Warren Area Sch.
Dist., 938 A.2d 274, 278–79 (Pa. 2007). IOGA only applies, however, to oil and natu-
ral gas; coal and other similar “fixed” mineral interests are still subject to ad valorem
taxation prior to extraction. See Indep. Oil & Gas Ass’n of Pa. v. Bd. of Assessment
Appeals of Fayette Cnty., 814 A.2d 180, 184 (Pa. 2002).
178. See, e.g., Herder Spring Hunting Club v. Keller, 93 A.3d 465, 473 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2014) (“We do not believe it proper to reach back, more than three score years, to
apply a modern sensibility and thereby undue that which was legally done.”); Greevy
& Shoemaker, supra note 23, at 115 (“[The title wash] was a rule that was needed and
was created by statute to meet the contingencies of the times. Many titles to what is
now very valuable oil and gas are dependent upon that rule, which has stood inviolate
for roughly 200 years.”).
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Thus, any title dispute regarding severed surface and mineral es-
tates that has previously been adjudicated through the application of
historic title wash principles would be left undisturbed, while courts
would resolve pending and future disputes by applying the new pro-
posed rule. Furthermore, those owners or lessees who have removed
and sold minerals and paid royalties based on previous understandings
of title superiority would not be responsible for damages or restitution
to newly determined mineral owners.
Another concern regarding a change in the current law is that there
may be parties who have made decisions about property ownership
and acquisition based on the current understanding of the title wash
but whose titles have not yet been challenged in court. Those parties
may claim it is unfair that they acquired property and believed that
property included the mineral rights, but enactment of the proposed
rule would instead vest superior title in the previous record owner.
The problem with this argument is that parties making such a claim
would most likely fall into one of two categories: (1) sophisticated
buyers who have performed extensive title research, are fully aware of
the prior mineral estate reservation, and have consulted with legal ex-
perts on the status of the mineral rights after the tax sale; or (2) unso-
phisticated buyers who have failed to perform a proper title search to
uncover the prior reservation.
While neither category engenders great sympathy, it is the former
that evokes the least concern. Buyers like Herder Spring Hunting
Club, who are fully cognizant of the prior reservation and have sought
legal advice concerning the issue, should doubtless understand that
the law in this area is far from settled. Purchasing vast tracts of real
property and leasing the mineral rights in reliance on a tax sale in the
chain of title that purportedly rejoined a previously severed and re-
corded mineral estate is, at best, a legal gamble. This gamble is espe-
cially apparent for modern-day buyers and lessees, as the various
court decisions on this issue have been anything but consistent. At the
end of the day, it can hardly be considered truly unfair for the pur-
chaser of real property, having actual or constructive notice of a previ-
ous severance and separate ownership of the mineral rights, to be
compelled to admit that the record mineral owner holds superior title.
VI. CONCLUSION
The proposed rule is not a perfect solution, and it unfortunately
leaves many previous record mineral estate owners, who have been
stripped of their property interests by the title wash, without means of
redress. Making such a modification in the law retroactive, however,
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would arguably introduce too much uncertainty into innumerable past
real estate transactions.179
But even an imperfect progression towards more equitable out-
comes—which better reflect modern legal values—easily trumps
clinging to outdated concepts for no other reason than continuity. As
the late Pennsylvania Supreme Court Chief Justice Samuel J. Roberts
admonished:
[The Pennsylvania Supreme] Court has full authority, and the corre-
sponding duty, to examine its precedents to assure that a rule previ-
ously developed is not perpetuated when the reason for the rule no
longer exists and when application of the rule would cause injustice.
On previous occasions this Court has not hesitated to reconsider
precedent in light of current social conditions and public policy.180
The need for the title wash has long since vanished, and the time is
ripe for Pennsylvania to implement a more equitable and modern
rule.
179. For example, suppose a party, who previously litigated and won a mineral es-
tate title dispute based on a court’s favorable view of the tax sale title wash, then
conveyed the mineral estate to a new owner. If the proposed rule would apply retro-
actively, the new good faith owner of the mineral estate could be subject to a quiet
title action by the party who lost the previous title dispute. Furthermore, depending
on when the original title dispute took place, there could be multiple subsequent con-
veyances that all would be upended by a retroactive application of the proposed rule.
180. Hack v. Hack, 433 A.2d 859, 867 (Pa. 1981).
